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This article studies the value of information in route choice decisions when a fraction of players have access to high
accuracy information about traffic incidents relative to others. To model such environments, we introduce a Bayesian
congestion game, in which players have private information about incidents, and each player chooses her route on a
network of parallel links. The links are prone to incidents that occur with an ex-ante known probability. The demand
is comprised of two player populations: one with access to high accuracy incident information and another with low
accuracy information, i.e. the populations differ only by their access to information. The common knowledge includes:
(i) the demand and route cost functions, (ii) the fraction of highly-informed players, (iii) the incident probability, and (iv)
the marginal type distributions induced by the information structure of the game. We present a full characterization of
the Bayesian Wardrop Equilibrium of this game under the assumption that low information players receive no additional
information beyond common knowledge. We also compute the cost to individual players and the social cost as a function
of the fraction of highly-informed players when they receive perfectly accurate information. Our first result suggests that
below a certain threshold of highly-informed players, both populations experience a reduction in individual cost, with the
highly-informed players receiving a greater reduction. However, above this threshold, both populations realize the same
equilibrium cost. Secondly, there exists another (lower or equal) threshold above which a further increase in the fraction
of highly-informed players does not reduce the expected social costs. Thus, once a sufficiently large number of players
are highly informed, wider distribution of more accurate information is ineffective at best, and otherwise socially harmful.
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1. Introduction
This article studies the effects of heterogeneous information on traffic route choices and travel time costs.
Our work is motivated by the recent advancements in (and widespread adoption of) Traveler Information
Systems (TIS). TIS inform their subscribed commuters of traffic conditions and routes based on historical
and current measurements of the network. Recently, the increased penetration of smartphones and other
GPS-enabled devices over the past decade has allowed for improved traffic data collection (Herrera et al.
(2010)) and has promoted the growth of traffic navigation services (Balakrishna et al. (2013)). Several
public agencies also use road side infrastructure (for example, changeable message signs) located at select
locations to alert to commuters about traffic conditions on onward routes (Emmerink et al. (1996), Chen
et al. (2003), Mortazavi (2009)).
However, even if all TIS providers typically want to provide the “true state” of the network, different
providers use different technologies and have access to different data. Users may choose different TIS
due to marketing, costs, availability, etc., and some may choose not to use TIS at all. This leads to an
inherently heterogeneous information structure of the commuting populace, since some commuters have
access to more accurate information than others. Furthermore, commuters may react to their beliefs of
others’ knowledge; e.g. a commuter may avoid a route because she believes that it will be congested because
she believes that the subscribers of a certain TIS are likely to take that route. It is therefore important not
only to model commuters’ beliefs of the network state, but also their beliefs about the other commuters.
This leads to the question: how does heterogeneous information about traffic incidents affect the commuters’
equilibrium route choices and costs?
To address this question, we introduce a Bayesian congestion game model which incorporates heteroge-
neous beliefs about the network state and about the other players (commuters). Under certain assumptions
about the information structure, we characterize the equilibrium of the game and analyze the equilibrium
costs. In particular, we focus on identifying the effects of providing incident information to a larger portion
of the population. We examine the value of information to players with access to high accuracy information,
and to those without this information. Finally, we analyze the effect of information on the social cost.
Our model is a static Bayesian congestion game on a parallel-route network, where the cost of each
route is an increasing function of the number of players utilizing that route and the incident state. Each
route has a commonly known prior probability of being in either an abnormal (or incident) or normal state.
Players are divided into two populations: those subscribed to a “high-accuracy” TIS (population H) and
those subscribed to a “low-accuracy” TIS (population L). Each TIS sends out a private signal to all of its
subscribers; the probability that the signal reports the true incident state is greater for the high-accuracy
TIS than for the low-accuracy one. Each player then updates her belief of the incident state based on the
signal she receives. We use the Bayesian Wardrop Equilibrium (BWE) as our solution concept. A strategy
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profile is a BWE if, for each player type, the expected costs of all utilized routes are equal and less than the
expected cost of each unutilized route.
Previous work has identified the need to consider information in modeling route choices. Ben-Akiva
et al. (1991) identify several potential phenomena that may occur due to commuters having access to traffic
information, including concentration, where commuters who receive the same information end up taking
the same route and causing congestion; and overreaction, where commuters may incorrectly estimate how
others will react to information, leading to oscillations and suboptimal decisions. Additionally, Ben-Akiva
et al. (1996) demonstrate that predictive traffic information provides a modest reduction in travel time for
commuters over myopic information, and importantly, drivers responding to myopic information may do
worse than those without any access to information. While our model captures the effect of concentration,
we do not address dynamic aspects such as oscillations, since they do not show up in the equilibrium of our
static model. Such analysis is better suited for dynamic models of traffic, such as repeated or multi-stage
games. However, our model is able to capture the equilibrium effects of players having incorrect beliefs
about other players or the network state.
One important line of work is the seminal “bottleneck” model of Vickery (1969), which accounts for
congestion costs due the time spent in queues and scheduling costs due to differences between desired and
actual arrival times. Notably, Arnott et al. (1991) begin to address the effect of potentially noisy information
about route capacities on route choices and congestion. They demonstrate that providing perfect information
to commuters about the network state reduces congestion, but inaccurate information can increase costs.
They also find that the utility of information is dependent on the probability of incident. To the best of
our knowledge, there has been no analogous analysis for network congestion games. In addition, their
results mainly focus on two boundary cases: one where only one commuter has access to information,
and the other case where all commuters have access. We contribute to the current literature on the value
of information in route choice problems by considering all fractions of informed commuters (players).
Specifically, we develop a network congestion model that incorporates incident probability, information
accuracy, and information distribution.
Additionally, Mahmassani and Jayakrishnan (1991) experimentally identify several effects of information
on traffic congestion through simulation. From their results, we would like to emphasize three particular
effects: (i) there exists an “optimal” fraction (less than 1) of players with information that results in the
maximum reduction in social cost; (ii) the cost for players with information increases as the fraction of
informed players increases; and (iii) even players without information receive a reduction in cost when
others have access to information. Although our model is a static, analytic model instead of a dynamic
simulation, we are still able to qualitatively capture these effects.
Another relevant body of literature is that of congestion games, which model the negative externali-
ties resulting from selfish choices of players. Classical results include the existence of a potential func-
tion in every congestion game (Rosenthal (1973)), and the isomorphism between congestion and potential
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games (Monderer and Shapley (1996)). More recently, Monderer (2007) considers a generalization of con-
gestion games with player-specific cost functions; also see Milchtaich (1996) for an earlier work in this
direction. In our work, players have identical preferences, and in the absence of information heterogeneity,
our game reduces to the classical potential game. Still, the existence, uniqueness, and structural properties
of our game’s equilibrium cannot be derived by straightforward application of the known results.
Significant work has also gone into characterizing the efficiency of equilibrium in congestion games,
including the well-known “price of anarchy” metric (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999)), (Roughgar-
den (2007)). Work on improving the performance in congestion games includes congestion pricing and
Stackelberg routing. Congestion pricing schemes include the “Pigouvian tax:” a tolling scheme where play-
ers pay a toll equal to the externality they impose on the network (Pigou (1932)). Beckmann et al. (1956)
built further on this idea, showing that for convex and increasing route functions, a social planner can reach
a socially optimal outcome by using marginal cost pricing. In Stackelberg routing, a central agency controls
a portion of the total demand and routes it in a way that improves system performance (Korilis et al. (1997)),
(Roughgarden (2004)), (Krichene et al. (2014)). In addition to congestion pricing and Stackelberg rout-
ing, providing information to commuters offers another method for system performance improvement. As
we demonstrate in our work, providing incident information to even a fraction of commuters can improve
system performance significantly; however, providing information to too many commuters can be coun-
terproductive. Thus, it is important to fully understand the effects of heterogeneous information on route
choices and system performance.
Some work has addressed the effects of information heterogeneity in congestion games, but from dif-
ferent perspectives. For example, Gairing et al. (2008) extend the congestion game framework to games of
incomplete information by introducing a Bayesian congestion game where players are uncertain about other
players’ demands. Importantly, Acemoglu et al. (2016) define and explore the “Informational Braess’ Para-
dox,” (IPB) a phenomenon where users who receive information about the existence of additional routes
may be worse off. They show that the IPB cannot occur in networks that are composed of series of linearly
independent (SLI) networks. For networks that are not SLI, there exists a configuration of edge-specific
cost functions where IBP will occur. While their work focuses on information about network structure, ours
focuses on (potentially noisy) information about network state. Both aspects must be considered in order to
understand the effects of information in congestion games.
Our model also contributes to the existing literature on congestion games by incorporating all of the fol-
lowing factors: the probability of increased cost due to an incident on a route, the fraction of the population
with access to information, and the accuracy of that information. In contrast to the boundary cases studied
by Arnott et al. (1991), we consider the full spectrum of information accuracy and distribution in a conges-
tion game framework. We also provide a game theoretical model that can capture many of the experimental
effects observed in Mahmassani and Jayakrishnan (1991). Finally, our treatment complements the recent
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work of Acemoglu et al. (2016) on information about network structure by analyzing the effects of noisy
information about network state.
In this paper, we limit our attention to a single origin-destination pair connected by two parallel routes,
where the main route is nominally shorter but prone to incidents and the alternative route is nominally longer
but not prone to incidents. We assume that there is a commonly known inelastic total demand, and that
population L receives an uninformative signal, i.e. population L only knows common knowledge. We also
assume that players know the marginal type distribution of the other players, where type encapsulates the
TIS and private signal received by the player. We also present other belief structures that can be considered
in our modeling environment, although we do not analyze their equilibrium effects. Note that our model
only considers route choice, and not departure time. Nonetheless, this decision does not unduly limit the
practicality of our model, since real-time TIS now allow commuters to make route choices after they are
already on the road.
Our main results are as follows: we present a full characterization of the equilibrium route choices under
the aforementioned assumptions. Additionally, we analyze the individual and social costs for player com-
positions ranging from all-uninformed to all-informed, under the assumption that population H receives the
exact realization of the network state. Relative to the baseline cost where all players are uninformed, we find
that there exists a threshold fraction of population H players below which both populations experience a
reduction in individual cost, with the highly informed players receiving a greater reduction. However, above
this threshold, both populations experience an equal reduction in cost, and the relative value of information
(difference between the two populations’ individual costs) is zero. Thus, below this threshold, a member of
population L would benefit from gaining access to information (i.e. joining population H), but above this
threshold, both populations are equally well off, so there is no incentive to gain access to the information.
We also characterize the social cost and observe that there is a reduction in social cost from increasing
the fraction of highly informed players, but only up to a threshold. This can be viewed as the “optimal”
level of information distribution for social cost reduction. Importantly, this second threshold is less than or
equal to the first, depending on the route cost and incident probability parameters. If this threshold is equal
to the first, then the relative value of information goes to zero and the social cost stops improving at the
same point. However, if this threshold is lower than the first, then there exists a range of fractions where
population L players would benefit if they became highly informed, but the social cost would increase if
they became highly informed.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the modeling environment; Section 3 presents
the Bayesian congestion game model; Section 4 describes belief structures that can be considered in our
modeling environment; Section 5 characterizes the equilibrium, and Section 6 analyzes the equilibrium
costs and value of information; Section 7 presents our concluding remarks.
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2. Modeling Environment
In Sec. 2.1, we introduce a parallel-route road network, populated by a set of players (commuters), who
incur the travel costs depending on the aggregate load in their chosen route and the state of the network. The
network is in the normal condition (state n) when there are no incidents on any route of the network. The
presence of traffic incident on a route r is represented by an abnormal condition (state ar) of the network.
The state of the network is random, governed by a known distribution. Next, in Sec. 2.2, we introduce a
set of Traffic Information Services (TISs) available to the players. The TISs in this set have different levels
of accuracy about the network state. Each player has access to a TIS of some exogenously given level
of accuracy. While we describe the modeling environment for finite player settings, the same description
extends to the population game of nonatomic players that we introduce in Section 3.2.
2.1. Effect of Random Incidents
Consider a set of N = {1, . . . ,N} players, where each player n ∈N chooses among a set of M parallel
routes,R = {r1, . . . , rM}, connecting a single origin node o and destination node d. Let D be the total traffic
demand induced by the players. We assume the demand is inelastic (i.e., fixed), and each player induces the
same demand on the network.
For each player n ∈N , denote the set of pure strategies (i.e. available route choices) as An ≡R. A pure
strategy profile is denoted a= (a1, . . . ,aN). Let ∆(An) denote the set of probability distributions over An, and
define ∆ :=∏n∆(An). Let xn ∈ ∆(An) denote a mixed strategy of player n, and x = (x1, . . . ,xN) ∈ ∆ a mixed
strategy profile for the set of players. A mixed strategy of player n is an M-dimensional probability vector
xn = (xn1, . . . ,x
n
M), where x
n
r denotes the player n’s probability of taking the route r ∈R.
The routes of the network are prone to random incidents. When a route r is experiencing an incident
(abnormal state ar), each player’s cost of traveling via this route is higher than the cost when there is no
incident on it. We model the allocation of incidents in the network via a fictitious player “Nature,” who
instantiates the “state” of the network (and thus, the state of the game) prior to players choosing their
routes. More generally, in incomplete information games, the concept of fictitious player (a.k.a. Nature) is
routinely used to instantiate all “payoff-relevant” parameters of the game (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).
We denote the random state of network as (θ1, . . . ,θM), which takes values in the set ∏Mr=1{nr,ar}. The state
n := (n1, . . . ,nM) represents the nominal state where there are no incidents on any route of the network. The
presence of an incident (i.e., abnormal state) on a route r of the network is represented by θr = ar.
We assume that route r is prone to an incident with an exogenously given Bernoulli probability pr, inde-
pendent of all the other routes. Then, the probability of the network state in which the routes r1, . . . , rk are
in the abnormal state (i.e. θ1 = a1, . . . ,θk = ak), and the routes rk+1, . . . , rM are in the nominal state (i.e.
θk+1 = nk+1, . . . ,θM = nM) is given by:
Pr(θ1 = a1, . . . ,θk = ak,θk+1 = nk+1, . . . ,θM = nM) =
k
∏
r=1
pr×
M
∏
r=k+1
(1− pr). (1)
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For simplicity, we assume that each route r ∈R has a linear cost function with state-dependent slopes
αθr ∈ R+, and state-independent free-flow travel times βr ∈ R+:
∀r ∈R, `θr
(
Qr
)
= αθr Qr+βr, (2)
where Qr = DN ∑
N
n=1 δ{an=r} is the total load induced by the players on route r. Our framework naturally
extends to allow for generalized cost functions. We expect that results qualitatively similar to the ones in
this paper hold for the case in which the cost function on each route is continuous and increasing in that
route’s load. It is conventional to impose that the slope of a route when it is facing an incident is greater than
or equal to the slope when it is not facing an incident, i.e., ∀r ∈R,αarr ≥ αnr . Similar assumptions are made
by Arnott et al. (1991) regarding the capacity of routes affected by incidents in the bottleneck model. Thus,
for a given demand, a route in the abnormal state is at least as costly as in the normal state. We assume that
the free-flow travel time, βr, is not affected by the state of network; this is mainly due to the observation
that incidents occurring during free flow tend to have little to no impact on the travel time of the route (Jin
and Amin (2014)).
For the ease of exposition, we will limit our attention to a two-route network (M = 2) as shown in Fig. 1a,
and impose the following assumption on the network state, and route-cost parameters:
ASSUMPTION 1. (A1)a Only the first route, r1, is prone to an incident with a probability p, and the
state of network takes values in the setΩ= {n,a}. With a slight abuse of notation, we use θ = a to represent
an incident on r1 and no incident on r2. State θ = n denotes that there are no incidents on any route.
(A1)b The slopes in the route cost functions (2) satisfy the ordering αa1 > α2 ≥ αn1 , i.e. the slope of the
first route’s cost function in the abnormal state is larger than the slope of the second route, which is in turn
larger than or equal to the slope of the first route in the normal state. In addition, the free-flow travel time
for the second route at least as high as that of the first route, i.e. β2 ≥ β1.
Fig. 1b illustrates (A1)a− (A1)b.
2.2. Effect of Heterogenenous Information
Existing models of route choices in transportation networks approach incidents as purely stochastic events
(Emmerink et al. (1998)). Thanks to traffic information services (TIS) such as GPS-enabled devices, smart-
phone applications, and in-vehicle navigation systems, commuters are increasingly aware of when and
where incidents happen. This enables the commuters to strategically choose their routes in response to
current traffic conditions in the network.
A classical paradigm of modeling the effect of incident information is by symmetrically improving the
information available across all players (de Palma et al. (2012)). However, in reality, commuters use dif-
ferent TIS with different accuracies, or they may choose not to use TIS at all. Additionally, commuters
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Figure 1 Model environment.
may have different beliefs regarding other players’ knowledge. This leads to a heterogeneous information
structure, and it is therefore unrealistic to ignore the information heterogeneity.
Motivated by the need to account for heterogeneous traffic information, we approach modeling incident
prone networks game theoretically. In our model, each player is subscribed exclusively to an information
service i ∈ I ≡ {H,L}, where H,L denote “High accuracy” and “Low accuracy” TIS, respectively. We
model the accuracy of the information service i ∈I by a scalar parameter η i ∈ [0.5,1], which is the like-
lihood that the TIS i will report the correct state of nature to any player subscribed to it. To account for a
higher accuracy of TIS H than TIS L, we let:
0.5≤ ηL < ηH ≤ 1. (3)
We will refer to players subscribed to information services i = H,L as “population H” and ”population L”,
respectively. Each player belongs to one of these populations only.
We let λH and λL denote respective fractions of players in populations H and L, where λL := 1− λH
since each player belongs to one of these populations only. Each player’s TIS is assigned with Bernoulli
probability λH; i.e. ∀n ∈N ,Pr(in = H) = λH,Pr(in = L) = 1−λH. Note that this assignment is independent
of the distribution of network state given in (1). Also note that for large N, λH can be viewed as the fraction
of players subscribed to TIS H.
We model the signal reported by each service as an outcome from a random variable yi defined over the
set {n,a}. The likelihood of a service reporting the true state of nature is given by:
∀i ∈ {H,L},
{
Pr(yi = a|θ = a) = η i,
Pr(yi = a|θ = n) = 1−η i. (4)
That is, if the true state of network is θ = a, it will report yi = a with probability η i and report yi = n with
complementary probability. Likewise, if the true state of network is n, the information service will report
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the signal yi = n with probability η i, and report the signal yi = a with complementary probability 1−η i.
Note that here we have assumed that that the accuracy of reporting the correct state is the same regardless
of the true state of network, i.e. the accuracy of each TIS is not affected by the state of network.
With the likelihoods (4) and the prior distribution on θ in (1), each player calculates her posterior belief
on the true state θ given the received signal yi from her TIS using Bayes’ rule (see Sec. 4 for a more precise
description on posterior beliefs):
∀n ∈N , in ∈ {H,L}, Pr(θ |yin)= Pr(θ)Pr(yin |θ)
Pr(yin)
.
We are now ready to introduce the notion of “type,” which captures all the private information available
to each player; see Harsanyi (1967). In our modeling environment, the signal sent to each player constitutes
the private information of the game, and thus defines the type for the player. We define type space for each
respective TIS as follows:
TH := {Hn,Ha}, TL := {Ln,La}. (5)
That is, for n ∈N , if player n’s information service in = H, then her type will be in the set TH; conversely,
if in = L, then her type will be in the set TL. If a player is assigned a type Hn, we mean that the player is
subscribed to the TIS i=H with accuracy parameter ηH, and has received a signal yi = n from it. Similarly, a
player with type La indicates that the TIS L (with accuracy parameter ηL) has provided a signal yi = a to the
player, and so on. Thus, the player type encapsulates the information service that the player is subscribed
to, the corresponding accuracy parameter, and the signal she receives from the service.
Liu, Amin, and Schwartz: Information Heterogeneity in Bayesian Congestion Games
10 Article submitted to Transportation Science; manuscript no. 1
3. Bayesian Routing Game
We now present the Bayesian congestion game with uncertain state and heterogeneous information access
about the state. We introduce two formulations of this model: (i) a game Γ f with a large but finite set of
atomic players, where all players have identical travel time preferences, and each player is subscribed to a
TIS of high (H) or low (L) accuracy; (ii) a game Γp with two populations of non-atomic players also with
identical travel time preferences, but one population has access to a more accurate TIS than the other. In
both formulations, players have private information about the state of the network, and make route choices
to minimize their expected individual cost (travel time) from origin o to destination d. We largely follow
the notational conventions of Bayesian games (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).
3.1. Finite Atomic Players.
We assume that the network state and route cost parameters are subject to Assumption (A1). Formally, the
Bayesian congestion game of N players is defined as follows:
Γ f := (N ,A,Ω,T,C,pi) , (6)
where:
- N is the set of N players (with generic member n)
- A = (An)n∈N is the set of action profiles, where An ≡R
- Ω= {n,a} is the set of game states (with generic member θ )
- T = (Tn)n∈N , where Tn is the type space of player n, with Tn = TH if n is subscribed to TIS H, and
Tn = TL otherwise. (TH and TL are defined in (5).)
- C= (`θr )r∈R is the set of cost functions, where cost of each route is given in (2). The cost to an individual
player is equal to the travel time of the route that she chooses.
- pi ∈ ∆(Ω×T) is a common prior which is a joint probability distribution pi(θ , tn, t−n) over the state of
the network and player types.
The common knowledge includes: the total demand D; the parameter λH governing the distribution of
players subscribed to each TIS; the set of routes R and the corresponding route cost parameters; the type
space for each TIS, TH,TL; and the common prior distribution pi , which includes the probability of incident
p. Importantly, the TIS’s accuracy parameters ηH and ηL may or may not be common knowledge. We
further explain the common prior specifications and the belief structure in Sec. 4.
ex ante•Players are assigned TIS H or L
Nature draws θ
TIS i reports yi to its subscribers
•interimPlayers: -know their type
-obtain beliefs µ i(·|t i)
-play strategies
•ex postPlayers realize costs
Figure 2 Timing of the game.
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The game is played as follows, see Fig 2: first, each player subscribes to one of the two TIS: a high
accuracy service (H), or a low accuracy one (L), according to Bernoulli probability λH; this determines each
players’ TIS subscription i. Nature then draws a realization of the network state θ from the distribution
(1). For a given realization of the state of the network (a or n), each TIS broadcasts a signal yi to all its
subscribers. For each player n, her TIS and signal recieved (yi) determine the player’s “type” tn ∈ TH or TL.
The players then simultanously choose their route based on type-dependent (mixed) strategies, xn : Tn →
∆(An), and realize their individual costs.
Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), once each player’s private information is realized, i.e., the play-
ers learn their types based on the signal received from their respective TIS, the game enters in an “interim”
stage. Each player n knows her own type tn but does not know the network state θ or the other players’
types t−n. This incomplete information is represented by the “interim” belief µn(·|tn) of each player n,
which she obtains after observing her type tn, but before choosing her route (see Sec. 4 for the interim
belief structures assumed in this article). We will use the notation µ = (µn)n∈N to denote the set of beliefs
µn(·|tn) ∈ ∆(Ω×T−n) for each player n over the state of the network and other players’ types, conditioned
on player n’s type.
The interim stage allows for an equivalent complete information formulation of the Bayesian game, where
the game is played between the player types, i.e. the “players” of the interim game are the player types, and
individual player costs can be calculated conditioned on the player types (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).
This allows us to express the interim expected cost function for each player for any mixed strategy profile
x(tn, t−n) = (xn(tn),x−n(t−n)) as follows:
∀n ∈N , E[`θr (Qr(xn,x−n)|tn] = ∑
(θ ,t−n)
µn(θ , t−n|tn)∑
a∈A
(
∏
j∈N
x j(a j|t j)
)
`θr (Qr(a
n,a−n)),
where µn(θ , t−n|tn) is player n’s belief on the state and other players’ types given its own type.
We are now ready to define the Bayesian Wardrop Equilibrium for the game Γ f .
DEFINITION 1. Bayesian Wardrop Equilibrium (BWE) for Γ f
The mixed strategy profile x∗ = (x1∗(t1), . . . ,xN∗(tN)) ∈ ∏A∆(An) is a BWE of the game Γ f if for each
player n ∈N , all routes that is played by player n with positive probability have equal expected individual
cost, which is less than the expected cost for any other route, where all expectations are taken over player
n’s belief, µn, i.e.:
∀n ∈N : xn∗r (an = r|tn)> 0 =⇒
E[`θan=r
(
Qr(xn∗(tn),x−n∗(t−n))
)|tn]≤ E[`θan=r′(Qr′(xn∗(tn),x−n∗(t−n)))|tn], ∀r′ ∈R
In the limit of large number of players, the contribution of a single player on the load, and thus to the
travel time, is negligible. To succinctly model such interactions between large numbers of players, we now
introduce in the following section a population game analog of Γ f , where each population is comprised
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of nonatomic players. The rest of the article will primarily consider the population game formulation. We
refer the reader to Sandholm (2010) for an excellent treatment of population games and the study of their
equilibria in a broad range of environments.
3.2. Populations of Nonatomic Players.
Now consider the game played between two populations of nonatomic players: population H and population
L. We index each population by their respective information service i, i.e. the players in population H are
subscribed to a high accuracy service and those in population L are subscribed to a low accuracy one.
With a slight abuse of notation, each population has a corresponding “splittable” demand governed by the
parameter λH:
DH := λHD, DL := λLD = (1−λH)D. (7)
We assume that all players belonging to population i receive the same realized signal yi, and the likelihood
TIS i reporting the true state is given by (4). The type space for each population is defined as in (5), and
all players in population i learn their type when they receive the signal yi from their respective information
service.
Each member of a population routes her demand through the network in a way that minimizes her own
expected travel cost. The resulting aggregate assignment of demands is referred to as the strategy dis-
tribution of the population. With an abuse of notation, let xi : Ti → ∆(Ai) denote an admissible strategy
distribution for population i, where xi(t i) = (xi1(t
i), . . . ,xiM(t
i)) can be viewed as a vector of split fractions,
with xir being the fraction of population i’s demand that takes route r when its type is t
i.
In the finite-player game, we used the notation x to denote a player’s mixed strategy; in this game we use
it to denote the split fraction for a population. We chose this abuse of notation because in the limit of large
number of players, the expected fraction of a population taking a given route approaches the probability
that a single representative member takes that route.
It is often convenient to consider population i’s strategy distribution in terms of the vector of loads that it
assigns to each route. For a strategy distribution xi(t i) of population i, let qi(t i) = (qi1(t
i), . . . ,qiM(t
i)) denote
the corresponding load vector, where
∀i ∈I ,∀r ∈R, qir(t i) := xir(t i)Di. (8)
We use (qH(tH),qL(tL)) to denote a generic profile of loads and (xH(tH),xL(tL)) to denote a profile of strategy
distributions (i.e. a profile of load split fractions). Let Qi denote the set of all admissible load vectors of
population i, i.e, for any qi(t i) ∈Qi we have ∑r qir(t i) = λiD.
Formally, the Bayesian congestion game of populations of nonatomic players can be defined as:
Γp = (I ,Q,Ω,T,C,pi) , (9)
where:
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- I = {H,L} is the set of player populations with generic population i
- Q = (Qi)i∈I is the set of load vectors for each population, i.e. (qi1(t
i), . . .qiM(t
i)) ∈Qi
- Ω= {n,a} is the set of game states with generic element θ
- T = (Ti)i∈I where TH and TL denote the type space for population H and L, respectively
- C = (`θr )r∈R is the set of cost functions for each route governed by (2).
- pi ∈ ∆(Ω×T) is the common prior which is a joint probability distribution pi(θ , tH, tL) over the state of
the network and player types.
The game Γp differs from the interim formulation of the game Γ f only by the assumption about player
effects on the routes’ loads. That is, each individual member of a population in Γp has negligible effect on
the load. The common knowledge in Γp is identical to that of Γ f . Thus, the timing of the game Γp is also
captured by Fig. 2.
For a load profile (qH(tH),qL(tL)) ∈QH×QL, the expected cost of population i on a given route is:
∀i ∈I , E[`θr
(
qir(t
i)+q−ir (t
−i)
)|t i] = ∑
(θ ,t−i)
`θr
(
qir(t
i)+q−ir (t
−i)
)
µ i(θ , t−i|t i). (10)
We are now ready to state the Bayesian Wardrop Equilibrium for the game Γp.
DEFINITION 2. Bayesian Wardrop Equilibrium (BWE) for Γp
A profile of load vectors (qi∗(t i),q−i∗(t−i)) ∈ Qi×Q−i, or the corresponding profile of strategy distri-
butions (xi∗(t i),x−i∗(t−i)), is an equilibrium if, for each population i in I , all routes that are utilized by
population i players have equal expected cost, which is less than the expected cost for any route not utilized
by players of population i, where all expectations are taken over population i’s belief µ i. That is:
∀i ∈I : qi∗r > 0 =⇒ E[`θr
(
qi∗r (t
i)+q−i∗r (t
−i)
)|t i]≤ E[`θr′(qi∗r′ (t i)+q−i∗r′ (t−i))|t i], ∀r′ ∈R. (11)
We observe from the definition of the game Γp that the parameters p,λH,ηH, and ηL govern the extend of
information heterogeneity that is captured in the belief µ . We will henceforth use the tuple (p,λH,ηH,ηL)
to represent the information environment of the game Γp.
3.3. Equilibrium costs
In any equilibrium profile (qi∗(t i),q−i∗(t−i))∈Qi×Q−i of game Γp, each population will have an associated
realized cost of traveling through the network whose actual state was unknown at the time of making
route choice decisions. The players realize their individual outcome after having played according to their
equilibrium strategy.
We define the equilibrium cost for a player of population i in state θ as follows:
Ci∗θ :=∑
r
∑
(ti,t−i)
xi∗r (t
i)`θr
(
qi∗r (t
i)+q−i∗r (t
−i)
)
Pr(t i|θ)Pr(t−i|θ), i ∈I ,θ ∈Ω. (12)
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One can average over populations and/or states to get various composite costs. We refer to the costs
averaged over states as expected population-dependent costs; the costs averaged over populations as the
state-dependent social cost; and the cost averaged over both populations and states as the expected social
cost. More precisely, these costs are defined as follows:
(i) The expected population-dependent cost in equilibrium is the average cost incurred by a player of a
given population across all network states:
Ci∗ := ∑
θ∈Ω
Pr(θ)Ci∗θ , i ∈I . (13)
(ii) The state-dependent social cost in equilibrium is the average cost incurred by a player of any popu-
lation for a given network state:
C∗θ := ∑
i∈I
λiCi∗θ , θ ∈Ω. (14)
(iii) The expected social cost in equilibrium is the average cost incurred by a player of any population
across all network states:
C¯∗ = ∑
i∈I
λi ∑
θ∈Ω
Pr(θ)Ci∗θ . (15)
For the sake of comparison, we define a baseline equilibrium cost in a given state C0∗θ as the equilibrium
cost of a player of population L under the information environment (p,λH = 0,ηH,ηL = 0.5). This baseline
corresponds to the cost in the case where all players belong to population L, and TIS L is uninformative.
Equivalently, it is the same as the realized cost for the corresponding subgame in the classical imperfect
information game, where each network state corresponds to a subgame. Similarly, we define the baseline
expected equilibrium cost as C0∗ = ∑θ∈ΩPr(θ)C0∗θ , which is also equivalent to the expected cost for the
imperfect information game.
We now define the socially optimal cost. The socially optimal play is that which minimizes the social
cost (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999)). We distinguish the quantities associated with socially optimal
play using the superscript dagger †. For a parallel-route network with linear route cost functions, the socially
optimal loads qθ† for each network state θ ∈Ω are given by the solution to the quadratic program:
min
1
2
(qθ†)ᵀSθqθ†+β ᵀqθ†
subject to ∑
r
qθ†r = D, q
θ†
r ≥ 0,
(16)
where Sθ is a diagonal matrix with elements (2αθ1 , . . . ,2αθM), and β is a column vector with elements
(β1, . . . ,βM). The corresponding socially optimal split fraction is denoted as xθ†.
The state-dependent socially optimal cost is defined as:
C†θ =∑
r
xθ†r `
θ
r
(
qθ†r
)
, θ ∈Ω, (17)
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and the socially optimal cost for the game is defined as:
C† =∑
θ
C†θPr(θ). (18)
Note that the socially optimal loads and costs depend only on physical parameters of the game. We present
the socially optimal loads for the two-route network in Fig. 1a for each state below:
qn†1 =
2α2D−β1+β2
2(αn1 +α2)
, qn†2 = D−qn†1
qa†1 =
2α2D−β1+β2
2(αa1 +α2)
, qa†2 = D−qa†1 .
Thus, the socially optimal cost of the game is the p-weighted average of the state-dependent socially optimal
costs:
C† = pC†a+(1− p)C†n, (19)
where the state-dependent socially optimal costs are given by:
C†n = x
n†
1 `
n
1
(
qn†1
)
+ xn†2 `2
(
qn†2
)
C†a = x
a†
1 `
a
1
(
qa†1
)
+ xa†2 `2
(
qa†2
)
.
3.4. Value of information
We now define the individual and social value of information for an information environment
(p,λH,ηH,ηL). These quantities represent the change in equilibrium cost that an individual and society
respectively receive from an information environment.
The individual value of information, denoted V iθ (p,λH,ηH,ηL), for population i in state θ is the difference
between the baseline equilibrium cost, C0∗θ , and the corresponding equilibrium cost in that state, C
i∗
θ , given
by (12), under the information environment (p,λH,ηH,ηL):
V iθ (p,λ
H,ηH,ηL) =C0∗θ −Ci∗θ (20)
Similarly, the expected individual value of information, denoted V i(p,λH,ηH,ηL), for population i is the
difference between the baseline expected equilibrium cost and the expected equilibrium cost for a player in
population i under the information environment (p,λH,ηH,ηL).
V i(p,λH,ηH,ηL) =C0∗−Ci∗ (21)
The individual value of information represents the reduction in equilibrium cost for a player in each popu-
lation due to the information environment when compared to a population of all uninformed players.
We also define the relative individual value of information, denoted Vθ (p,λH,ηH,ηL), in a given state
as the difference between the corresponding individual values for players in populations L and H in that
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state. Similarly, we define the relative expected individual value, denoted V (p,λH,ηH,ηL), as the difference
between the expected individual values. Thus, these quantities can be written as follows:
Vθ (p,λH,ηH,ηL) :=V Lθ (p,λ
H,ηH,ηL)−V Hθ (p,λH,ηH,ηL),
V (p,λH,ηH,ηL) :=V L(p,λH,ηH,ηL)−V H(p,λH,ηH,ηL).
(22)
(23)
The relative individual value represents the change in equilibrium cost that a player in population L would
experience if she could become a member of population H, ceteris paribus.
The social value of information represents the change in social cost due to an information environment
compared to the baseline equilibrium cost. Specifically, the social value of an information in a given state,
denoted Wθ (p,λH,ηH,ηL), is the difference between the baseline social cost C0∗θ and the corresponding
equilibrium social cost C∗θ in that state:
Wθ (p,λH,ηH,ηL) :=C0∗θ −C∗θ . (24)
Similarly, we define expected social value of information, denoted W (p,λH,ηH,ηL), as the difference
between the expected baseline equilibrium cost and the equilibrium expected social cost. Equivalently, the
expected social value can be calculated as the average of the social value in each state, weighted by the
probability of each state:
W (p,λH,ηH,ηL) :=C0∗−C¯∗ =∑
θ
Wθ (p,λH,ηH,ηL)Pr(θ). (25)
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4. Beliefs
Recall that in Sec. 3.2 the Bayesian congestion game Γp is defined terms of the interim beliefs µH (θ , tL|tH)
for population H and µL (θ , tH|tL) for population L, where the type t i ∈ Ti encapsulates the private infor-
mation of players in population i about their TIS’s accuracy and the received signal. Each player’s interim
belief can be viewed as the posterior distribution obtained using a Bayesian update to a common prior
pi ∈ ∆(Ω×TL×TH) after receiving their type. In our presentation of interim beliefs and subsequent equi-
librium characterization, we limit our attention to game Γp of non-atomic players; however, our set-up is
extensible to the game Γ f of finite-atomic players (Sec. 3).
In this section, we present three different treatments (environments) for obtaining interim beliefs; each
treatment supposes a different information structure:
(i) In Sec. 4.1, we consider the TIS likelihoods (4) as part of prior belief, i.e. both populations have
a common prior belief p˜i = Pr(θ) · Pr(tH|θ) · Pr(tL|θ). This corresponds to an environment where each
population knows the distribution of nature state, the likelihood distribution of its own TIS, and that of
the other TIS. In this case, players from each population form their interim beliefs using the conditional
distribution of the other population’s type for each state of the nature.
(ii) In Sec. 4.2, we suppose a more restrictive information structure in that the marginal type distribu-
tions Pr(t i) = ∑θ Pr(θ)Pr(t i|θ), i ∈ {H,L} are part of prior belief, i.e., the common prior belief is pˆi =
Pr(θ) ·Pr(tH) ·Pr(tL). In this case, players do not know the TIS likelihood of those in the other population.
Thus, each population’s interim beliefs are constructed using the distribution of nature state, the likelihood
distribution of its own TIS, and the marginal type distribution of the other population.
(iii) Finally, in Sec. 4.3, we consider a special case of the information structure in Sec. 4.2 where the
TIS L is uninformative, i.e., 0.5 = ηL < ηH ≤ 1. The population L’s information service does not give any
information about Nature’s state, i.e. TIS L is equally likely to report any state, regardless of the true state
of nature, and population H is better informed about the Nature state for any ηH > 0.5.
We will denote the population i’s interim beliefs for these cases as µ˜ i, µˆ i, and µ¯ i, respectively. In all three
cases, the interim beliefs can be generically expressed as follows:
∀i ∈I , µ i (θ , t−i|t i)= Pri(θ , t i, t−i)
Pr(t i)
=
Pr(θ)Pri(t i, t−i|θ)
Pr(t i)
=
Pr(θ)Pri(t i|θ)
Pr(t i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pri(θ |ti)
Pri(t−i|t i,θ).
Now notice that in our modeling environment t i and t−i are independent, conditioned on θ . Therefore, we
can express the interim beliefs as follows:
∀i ∈I , µ i (θ , t−i|t i)= Pr(θ)Pri(t i|θ)
Pr(t i)
Pri(t−i|θ). (26)
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Before moving to the specific cases, we compute the marginal type distributions Pr(t i). From (4), we note
that Pr(tH =Ha|θ = a) = Pr(yH|θ = a) = ηH. Writing similar expressions for the conditional probability of
each t i ∈ Ti given the occurrence of a nature state, we can express the marginal type distributions Pr(tH =
Ha) and Pr(tL = Ha) as follows:
Pr(tH = Ha) = pηH+(1− p)(1−ηH)
Pr(tL = La) = pηL+(1− p)(1−ηL). (27)
Also note that Pr(tH = Hn) = 1−Pr(tH = Ha), and Pr(tL = Ln) = 1−Pr(tL = La). For notational ease, we
will henceforth refer to Pr(tH = Hn) as Pr(Hn), and Pr(tH = Ha) as Pr(Ha), etc.
4.1. TIS Conditional Likelihoods are Common Knowledge
In this case, players in each population know the TIS likelihood distribution of the other population. Thus,
PrL(tH = Ha|θ = a) = ηH and PrL(tH = Ha|θ = n) = (1−ηH). Substituting the expressions of PrL(t i|θ)
and PrL(tH|θ) in (26), the population L’s interim belief µ˜L can be written as:
µ˜L(θ = a, tH = Ha|tL = La) = pη
L
Pr(La)
ηH
µ˜L(θ = a, tH = Hn|tL = La) = pη
L
Pr(La)
(1−ηH)
µ˜L(θ = n, tH = Ha|tL = La) = (1− p)(1−η
L)
Pr(La)
(1−ηH)
µ˜L(θ = n, tH = Hn|tL = La) = (1− p)(1−η
L)
Pr(La)
ηH
µ˜L(θ = a, tH = Ha|tL = Ln) = p(1−η
L)
Pr(Ln)
ηH
µ˜L(θ = a, tH = Hn|tL = Ln) = p(1−η
L)
Pr(Ln)
(1−ηH)
µ˜L(θ = n, tH = Ha|tL = Ln) = pη
L
Pr(Ln)
(1−ηH)
µ˜L(θ = n, tH = Hn|tL = Ln) = pη
L
Pr(Ln)
ηH.
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Similarly, under the knowledge of Pr(tL|θ), the population H’s interim belief µ˜H can be written as follows:
µ˜H(θ = a, tL = La|tH = Ha) = pη
H
Pr(Ha)
ηL
µ˜H(θ = a, tL = Ln|tH = Ha) = pη
H
Pr(Ha)
(1−ηL)
µ˜H(θ = n, tL = La|tH = Ha) = (1− p)(1−η
H)
Pr(Ha)
(1−ηL)
µ˜H(θ = n, tL = Ln|tH = Ha) = (1− p)(1−η
H)
Pr(Ha)
ηL
µ˜H(θ = a, tL = La|tH = Hn) = p(1−η
H)
Pr(Hn)
ηL
µ˜H(θ = a, tL = Ln|tH = Hn) = p(1−η
H)
Pr(Hn)
(1−ηL)
µ˜H(θ = n, tL = La|tH = Hn) = (1− p)η
H
Pr(Hn)
(1−ηL)
µ˜H(θ = n, tL = Ln|tH = Hn) = (1− p)η
H
Pr(Hn)
ηL.
The common knowledge of TIS conditional likelihoods might be an appropriate assumption when TIS
providers are competitive firms who have researched their competitor’s TIS. However, in a large class of
route choice scenarios faced by commuters, a more realistic assumption on the information structure is the
case when only marginal type distributions are common knowledge, which we consider next.
4.2. TIS Marginal Type Distributions are Common Knowledge
In this case, each population does not know the conditional distribution of their opponent’s type, but knows
the opponent’s marginal type distribution. In contrast to (26), each player’s interim beliefs under this restric-
tive information structure can be expressed as follows:
∀i ∈I , µˆ i (θ , t−i|t i)= Pr(θ)Pri(t i|θ)
Pr(t i)
Pr(t−i). (28)
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Using (27) in (28), we can write the population L’s interim belief µˆL as follows:
µˆL(θ = a, tH = Ha|tL = La) = pη
L
Pr(La)
Pr(Ha)
µˆL(θ = a, tH = Hn|tL = La) = pη
L
Pr(La)
Pr(Hn)
µˆL(θ = n, tH = Ha|tL = La) = (1− p)(1−η
L)
Pr(La)
Pr(Ha)
µˆL(θ = n, tH = Hn|tL = La) = (1− p)(1−η
L)
Pr(La)
Pr(Hn)
µˆL(θ = a, tH = Ha|tL = Ln) = p(1−η
L)
Pr(Ln)
Pr(Ha)
µˆL(θ = a, tH = Hn|tL = Ln) = p(1−η
L)
Pr(Ln)
Pr(Hn)
µˆL(θ = n, tH = Ha|tL = Ln) = pη
L
Pr(Ln)
Pr(Ha)
µˆL(θ = n, tH = Hn|tL = Ln) = pη
L
Pr(Ln)
Pr(Hn).
Similarly, when the population H knows the marginal type distribution Pr(tL) but does not know Pr(tL|θ),
population H’s interim belief distribution µˆH can be expressed as follows:
µˆH(θ = a, tL = La|tH = Ha) = pη
H
Pr(Ha)
Pr(La)
µˆH(θ = a, tL = Ln|tH = Ha) = pη
H
Pr(Ha)
Pr(Ln)
µˆH(θ = n, tL = La|tH = Ha) = (1− p)(1−η
H)
Pr(Ha)
Pr(La)
µˆH(θ = n, tL = Ln|tH = Ha) = (1− p)(1−η
H)
Pr(Ha)
Pr(Ln)
µˆH(θ = a, tL = La|tH = Hn) = p(1−η
H)
Pr(Hn)
Pr(La)
µˆH(θ = a, tL = Ln|tH = Hn) = p(1−η
H)
Pr(Hn)
Pr(Ln)
µˆH(θ = n, tL = La|tH = Hn) = (1− p)η
H
Pr(Hn)
Pr(La)
µˆH(θ = n, tL = Ln|tH = Hn) = (1− p)η
H
Pr(Hn)
Pr(Ln).
4.3. Uninformative TIS L (ηL = 0.5)
We now consider a specific case of Sec. 4.2 when ηL = 0.5, i.e. Pr(tL) = Pr(tL|θ). This case is of special
interest to us because it allows a population L that knowns no more about the nature state than the prior
distribution Pr(θ), and is also uniformed about the TIS H’s conditional likelihood Pr(tH|θ). Hence, in this
case, population L receives no private information.
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It is easy to argue that when ηL = 0.5, the signal that any player of type La or Ln receives is completely
uninformative of the state of nature; hence, the belief of any player subscribed to TIS L is no more informa-
tive than common prior belief pˆi . Since the commuters of type Ln and La have identical beliefs about the
nature state and about the population H’s type, they also have identical strategies. Furthermore, commuters
in the population H have identical beliefs about type Ln and La. Thus, La and Ln no longer need to be
distinguished. Henceforth, we will consider only a single equivalent type that represents both La and Ln;
we refer to it as type L. Indeed, if ηL > 0.5, it is not possible make this simplification.
Under the aforementioned simplification, population L’s interim belief µ¯L can be expressed as follows:
µ¯L(θ = a, tH = Ha|tL = L) = pPr(Ha)
µ¯L(θ = a, tH = Hn|tL = L) = pPr(Hn)
µ¯L(θ = n, tH = Ha|tL = L) = (1− p)Pr(Ha)
µ¯L(θ = n, tH = Hn|tL = L) = (1− p)Pr(Hn).
(29)
Finally, when the population H players still know the marginal type distribution Pr(tL) and face an unin-
formed population L (ηL = 0.5), their interim belief distribution µ¯H can be written as follows:
µ¯H(θ = a, tL = L|tH = Ha) = pη
H
Pr(Ha)
µ¯H(θ = n, tL = L|tH = Ha) = (1− p)(1−η
H)
Pr(Ha)
µ¯H(θ = a, tL = L|tH = Hn) = p(1−η
H)
Pr(Hn)
µ¯H(θ = n, tL = L|tH = Hn) = (1− p)η
H
Pr(Hn)
(30)
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5. Equilibrium
In this section, we present a full characterization the Bayesian Wardrop Equilibrium (BWE) of the game
Γp = (I ,Q,Ω,T,C,pi) with the interim beliefs µ¯ as in (29) and (30), i.e. under the information structure
induced by ηL = 0.5 and when TIS marginal type distributions are common knowledge. In our subsequent
analysis, we use the notation qtir to denote the load q
i
r(t
i) on route r of population i when they are type t i.
Similarly, we use the notation xti1 to denote the strategy distribution (or split fraction) x
ti
1 (t
i) on route r of
population i when they are type t i. Recall that load and split fraction are related by (8).
Without loss of generality, we will assume that the total demand is sufficiently large that the cost of
placing all of the demand on the first route in the normal state is costlier than the free-flow cost of the second
route, i.e.:
D>
β2−β1
αn1
. (31)
This assumption guarantees that there is no equilibrium where all the demand is routed on the same route.
5.1. Equilibrium Characterization
In the two-route network (Fig 1a), the BWE conditions (Definition 2) can be interpreted as follows: if all
players in a population play exclusively one route in equilibrium when they are type t i, i.e. xti∗1 = 0 or 1,
then the expected cost of the route taken must be less than that of the other route. On the other hand, if the
players of a population split and take both routes when they are type t i, i.e. xti∗1 ∈ (0,1), then the expected
cost on both routes are equal. This creates three qualitatively different strategy distributions for each player
type: exclusively take r1, exclusively take r2, or split some demand on each. These are expressed below:
∀i ∈I , t i ∈ Ti,

xt
i∗
1 = 0 =⇒ Eµ¯ [`θ1
(
qt
−i∗
1
)|t i]< Eµ¯ [`θ2(Dt∗+qt−i∗2 )|t i]
xt
i∗
1 = 1 =⇒ Eµ¯ [`θ1
(
Dt
i∗+qt
−i∗
1
)|t i]> Eµ¯ [`θ2(qt−i∗2 )|t i]
xt
i∗
1 ∈ (0,1) =⇒ Eµ¯ [`θ1
(
qt
i∗
1 +q
t−i∗
1
)|t i] = Eµ¯ [`θ2(qti∗2 +qt−i∗2 )|t i].
(32a)
(32b)
(32c)
Since there are three player types (L,Hn,Ha), this leads to 33 = 27 combinations of qualitatively different
strategy distribution profiles that must be considered.
The expected route costs (10) according to the interim beliefs µ¯ given in (29) for players in population L
on route r can be expressed as follows:
Eµ¯ [`θr
(
qLr +q
tH
r
)|tL = L] =µ¯L(θ = a, tH = Ha)`ar (qLr +qHar )+ µ¯L(θ = a, tH = Hn)`ar (qLr +qHnr )
+ µ¯L(θ = n, tH = Ha)`nr
(
qLr +q
Ha
r
)
+ µ¯L(θ = n, tH = Hn)`nr
(
qLr +q
Hn
r
)
=pPr(Ha)`ar
(
qLr +q
Ha
r
)
+ pPr(Hn)`ar
(
qLr +q
Hn
r
)
+(1− p)Pr(Ha)`nr
(
qLr +q
Ha
r
)
+(1− p)Pr(Hn)`nr
(
qLr +q
Hn
r
)
. (33)
Similarly, the expected route costs for players in population H given the belief µ¯ given in (30) can be
expressed as:
Eµ¯ [`θr
(
qHar +q
L
r
)|tH = Ha] = pηH
Pr(Ha)
`ar
(
qHar +q
L
r
)
+
(1− p)(1−ηH)
Pr(Ha)
`nr
(
qHar +q
L
r
)
, (34)
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for type Ha, and:
Eµ¯ [`θr
(
qHnr +q
L
r
)|tH = Hn] = p(1−ηH)
Pr(Hn)
`ar
(
qHnr +q
L
r
)
+
(1− p)ηH
Pr(Hn)
`nr
(
qHnr +q
L
r
)
. (35)
for type Hn.
We now explore how the equilibrium is affected by the non-physical parameters of the game, i.e. those
which are not characteristic of the underlying network: the probability of incident (p), the fraction of players
subscribed to TIS H (λH), and the accuracy of TIS H (ηH). Before moving forward, let us define the four
following parameter regimes:
φ1 =
{
(p,λH,ηH) ∈ (0,1)× [0,1]× (0.5,1] | 0≤ λH < Λ1(ηH, p)
}
φ2 =
{
(p,λH,ηH) ∈ (0,1)× [0,1]× (0.5,1] | Λ1(ηH, p)≤ λH ≤ Λ2(ηH, p)
}
φ3 =
{
(p,λH,ηH) ∈ (0,1)× [0,1]× (0.5,1] | Λ2(ηH, p)< λH < Λ3(ηH, p)
}
φ4 =
{
(p,λH,ηH) ∈ (0,1)× [0,1]× (0.5,1] | Λ3(ηH, p)≤ λH ≤ 1
} (36)
where:
Λ1(ηH, p) :=
K1(α̂1− α¯1Pr(Ha))
DPr(Hn)(α̂1+α2Pr(Ha))
,
Λ2(ηH, p) :=
K1−Pr(Ha)K2
DPr(Hn)
,
Λ3(ηH, p) :=
K3
D
,
α¯1 := (1− p)αn1 + pαa1 ,
α̂1 := (1− p)(1−ηH)αn1 + pηHαa1 ,
α˜1 := (1− p)ηHαn1 + p(1−ηH)αa1 ,
K0 := α2D−β1+β2,
K1 :=
K0
α¯1+α2
,
K2 :=
K0Pr(Ha)
α̂1+Pr(Ha)α2
,
K3 :=
K0Pr(Hn)
α˜1+Pr(Hn)α2
.
(37)
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Figure 3 Illustration of the BWE in φ1. Dashed blue represents population H, and solid red represents L.
The following proposition gives the BWE in Regime φ1. This corresponds to the case where the fraction
of players that belong to population H is small, and all players in this population take r1 when they receive
signal n and route r2 when they receive signal a. Figure 3 illustrates this play.
PROPOSITION 1. [Equilibrium for Regime φ1]
For (p,λH,ηH) ∈ φ1, the BWE of Γp is:
(xL∗1 ,(x
Hn∗
1 ,x
Ha∗
1 )) =
(
K1
(1−λH)D −
Pr(Hn)λH
1−λH ,(1,0)
)
, (38)
i.e., the fraction xL∗1 of players in population L choose r1; if players in population H receive the signal n
(resp. a), they all take r1 (resp. r2).
Proof of Proposition 1. For the split fractions (38) to be an equilibrium strategy, it must satisfy the
Wardrop conditions: type L’s expected cost must satisfy (32c); type Hn’s expected cost must satisfy (32a),
and type Ha’s expected cost must satisfy (32b). Since xHn∗1 = 1 and xHa∗1 = 0, we obtain that qHn∗1 = λHD, and
qHa∗1 = 0. This yields the following conditions:
qL∗1 = K1−λHDPr(Hn)
K2 < qL∗1 < K3−λHD
One can check that the aforementioned bounds on qL∗1 are satisfied when λH < Λ1(ηH, p), i.e. (p,λH,ηH) ∈
φ1. 
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Figure 4 Illustration of the BWE in φ2. Dashed blue represents population H, and solid red represents L.
Secondly, the following proposition gives the BWE in Regime φ2. This corresponds to the case where
population H is sufficiently large that its players can no longer exclusively take r2 when they receive signal
a. However, the size of population H is still small enough that its players can exclusively take r1 when they
receive signal n. Fig 4 illustrates this play.
PROPOSITION 2. [Equilibrium for Regime φ2]
For (p,λH,ηH) ∈ φ2, the BWE of Γp is:
(xL∗1 ,(x
Hn∗
1 ,x
Ha∗
1 )) =
(
K1−λHDPr(Hn)−Pr(Ha)K2
(1−λH)DPr(Hn) ,
(
1,
λHDPr(Hn)+Pr(Ha)K2−K1
λHDPr(Hn)
))
, (39)
i.e. the fraction xL∗1 of players in population L choose r1; if players of population H receive the signal n, they
all take r1, and if they receive the signal a, the fraction xHa∗1 of population H chooses the first route.
Proof of Proposition 2. For the split fractions (39) to be an equilibrium strategy, it must satisfy the
Wardrop conditions: type L’s expected cost must satisfy (32c); type Hn’s expected cost must satisfy (32a),
and the expected costs for type Ha must satisfy (32c). Since xHn∗1 = 1, we obtain qHn∗1 = λHD. Combined
with the Wardrop conditions, this yields:
qL∗1 +q
Ha∗
1 Pr(Ha) = K1−λHDPr(Hn) ,
qL∗1 +q
Ha∗
1 = K2,
qL∗1 ≤ K3−λHD. (40)
Solving for qL∗1 and q
Ha∗
1 gives the following expressions:
qL∗1 =
K1−λHDPr(Hn)−Pr(Ha)K2
Pr(Hn)
,
qHa∗1 =
λHDPr(Hn)+Pr(Ha)K2−K1
Pr(Hn)
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In order for qL∗1 and q
Ha∗
1 to be non-negative and satisfy (40), we find that Λ1(ηH, p) ≤ λH ≤ Λ2(ηH, p), i.e.
(p,λH,ηH) ∈ φ2. 
r1
r2
o d
(a) Population H receives signal n
r1
r2
o d!
(b) Population H receives signal a
Figure 5 Illustration of the BWE in φ3. Dashed blue represents population H, and solid red represents L.
The following proposition gives the BWE in Regime φ3. This corresponds to the case where the players in
population L exclusively choose r2 in order to “avoid” the significant expected load on r1 due to population
H players. Figure 5 illustrates this play.
PROPOSITION 3. [Equilibrium for Regime φ3]
For (p,λH,ηH) ∈ φ3, the BWE of Γp is:
(xL∗1 ,(x
Hn∗
1 ,x
Ha∗
1 )) =
(
0,
(
1,
K2
λHD
))
, (41)
i.e. all players in population L take r2; if players in population H receive the signal n, they all take r1, and
if they receive the signal a, the fraction xHa∗1 of population H take r1.
Proof of Proposition 3. For the split fractions (41) to be an equilibrium strategy, it must satisfy the
Wardrop conditions: population L’s expected cost must satisfy (32a); type Hn’s expected cost must satisfy
(32b) and the expected cost for Ha must satisfy (32c). Since xL∗1 = 0 and xHn∗1 = 1, we obtain qL∗1 = 0 and
qHn∗1 = λHD. Substituting into the Wardrop conditions yields:
qHa∗1 = K2,
K1−Pr(Ha)K2
Pr(Hn)D
< λH <
K3
D
.
The aforementioned bounds on λH correspond to Λ2(ηH, p)< λH < Λ3(ηH, p), i.e. (p,λH,ηH) ∈ φ3. 
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The following proposition gives the BWE in Regime φ4. This corresponds to the case where population
H is sufficiently large that its players can no longer exclusively take r1 when they receive signal n and thus
a fraction of the players take r2 when they receive n. Figure 3 illustrates this play.
PROPOSITION 4. [Equilibrium for Regime φ4]
For (p,λH,ηH) ∈ φ3, the BWE of Γp is:
(xL∗1 ,(x
Hn∗
1 ,x
Ha∗
1 )) =
(
0,
(
K3
λHD
,
K2
λHD
))
, (42)
i.e. all players in population L take r2; if players in population H receive the signal n (resp. a), the fraction
xHn∗1 (resp. x
Ha∗
1 ) take r1.
r1
r2
o d
(a) Population H receives signal n
r1
r2
o d!
(b) Population H receives signal a
Figure 6 Illustration of the BWE in φ4. Dashed blue represents population H, and solid red represents L.
Proof of Proposition 4. For the split fractions (41) to be an equilibrium strategy, it must satisfy the
Wardrop conditions: the expected cost of population L players must satisfy (32b), and both Hn and Ha’s
expected costs must satisfy (32c). Since xL∗1 = 0, we obtain q
L∗
1 = 0. Combining this with the Wardrop
conditions yields:
qHn∗1 = K3
qHa∗1 = K2
Pr(Hn)qHn∗1 +Pr(Ha)q
Ha∗
1 > K1 (43)
The condition (43) is satisfied if 0< p< 1 and 0.5< ηH ≤ 1, which is true by assumption. The equilibrium
demands must be no greater than the total demand of that population, i.e. qHn∗1 ,q
Ha∗
1 ≤ λHD. This is satisfied
if λH ≥ Λ3(ηH, p), i.e. (p,λH,ηH) ∈ φ4. 
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We find that the rest of the 27 possible strategy profiles are not equilibrium profiles. Some of these profiles
are infeasible, such as profiles that result in negative loads on routes. Other strategies are strictly dominated.
Let us argue that strategy profiles where xHa∗1 ≥ xHn∗1 are strictly dominated by those where xHa∗1 < xHn∗1 . Since
population L always plays exactly the same strategy, population H expects the same demand on r1 due to
the population L players. Additionally, population H expects the slope of r1 to be greater when they receive
signal a, since they now know it’s more likely that r1 is in the incident state. Thus, their expected cost of
routing the same demand on r1 will be higher when they receive signal a than when they receive signal n.
Therefore strategies where xHa∗1 ≥ xHn∗1 are dominated by those where xHa∗1 < xHn∗1 .
We omit an exhaustive analysis of all 27 profiles for the sake of brevity. Table 1 summarizes the strategy
profiles and whether or not they can exist in equilibrium. Interestingly enough, we find that for all parameter
values, at least one population type exclusively takes one route in equilibrium. That is, under the information
structure assumed in µ¯ , the game Γp does not admit an equilibrium where all types split their demand: there
are no parameter values where all of xL∗1 ,x
Hn∗
1 ,x
Ha∗
1 ∈ (0,1).
HHHHHx
Hn∗
1
xHa∗1 = 0 ∈ (0,1) = 1
= 0 7 7 7
∈ (0,1) 7 7 7
= 1 7 7 7
(a) L play r1 exclusively (xL∗1 = 1)
HHHHHx
Hn∗
1
xHa∗1 = 0 ∈ (0,1) = 1
= 0 7 7 7
∈ (0,1) 7 7 7
= 1 φ1 φ2 7
(b) L split between r1, r2 (xL∗1 ∈ (0,1))
HHHHHx
Hn∗
1
xHa∗1 = 0 ∈ (0,1) = 1
= 0 7 7 7
∈ (0,1) 7 φ4 7
= 1 7 φ3 7
(c) L play r2 exclusively (xL∗1 = 0)
Table 1 Strategy profiles for the Bayesian Congestion Game. Equilibrium strategy profiles are marked with
their corresponding parameter regimes. Non-equilibrium profiles are marked with a cross.
5.2. Remarks on Equilibrium Structure
We illustrate in Figure 7a the four equilibrium regimes under the assumption that population H has perfectly
accurate reports of the state, i.e. ηH = 1. Unless otherwise specified, the parameters for the two route
network in our numerical examples take the values given in Table 2. Notably, the width of φ1 decreases and
the width of φ3 increases as p increases. Additionally, the right boundary of φ3, Λ3(ηH, p), is a constant with
respect to incident probability, p.
Quantity symbol value units
r1 slope, state n αn1 1 min/(veh hr−1)
r1 slope, state a αa1 3 min/(veh hr−1)
r2 slope α2 2 min/(veh hr−1)
r1 intercept β1 19 min
r2 intercept β2 21 min
Total demand D 5 103 veh hr−1
Table 2 Parameter values for two-route network example.
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(a) Equilibrium regimes in the λH− p plane
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(b) Equilibrium split fractions vs. λH, p = 0.2
Figure 7 Equilibrium regimes and split fractions for ηH = 1.
We illlustrate the equilibrium split fraction in all four regimes for each population and state signals in
Figure 7b. In regime φ1, the players of population L take both routes; in this numerical example, approxi-
mately 70% of the population L players choose the first route, and the rest take the second route. Increasing
the fraction of population H players in this regime has a small effect of linearly decreasing the fraction of
population L that chooses r1. In regime φ2, increasing the fraction of population H has a more dramatic
effect, and the population L players shift toward taking the second route, until in regimes φ3 and φ4, the
population L players take route 2 exclusively.
For population H players, their play depends on the signal received. When they receive the signal n,
population H players take route 1 exclusively for the first three regimes. Unlike population L players, they
know that the first route will be uncongested and thus it will be less costly than taking the second route. It is
only when the fraction of population H players gets sufficiently high in regime φ4, that population H players
have to start taking second route.
On the other hand, when population H players receive the signal a, the equilibrium strategy in regime
φ1 is to exclusively take r2. In this regime, the size of the population H population is small enough that
they can all take the second route and avoid the congestion due to the incident. However, in regime φ2,
population H is large enough that it’s no longer possible for its players to exclusively take r2. This reflects
the phenomenon of concentration in the sense of Ben-Akiva et al. (1991), where commuters that receive
the same information all take the same route, increasing the cost. Thus, in regime φ2, we observe that the
split fraction increases as some population H players take route r1 even when they receive the signal a. In
regimes φ3–φ4, the population H players react to the population L players exclusively taking route 2; in
these regimes, the split fraction decreases as λH increases.
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We note that we recover the classical game formulations at the boundaries of our game. First, in the
limiting case where λH = 0, we recover the classical imperfect information formulation of the game, where
all players belong to population L. The equilibrium split fraction for population L approaches K1/D as
λH → 0, which is the Wardrop equilibrium strategy for the classical imperfect information case. Second,
we recover the classical perfect information formulation of the game in the limiting case of λH = 1 and
ηH = 1, i.e., everyone belongs to population H and receives perfectly accurate information. Under these
conditions, the equilibrium split fractions for each of the player types xHn∗1 ,x
Ha∗
1 correspond to the Wardrop
equilibrium of subgames for θ = n and θ = a respectively: taking the limits λH → 1 and ηH → 1 yield
xHn∗1 =
K0
D(αn1 +α2)
, and xHa∗1 =
K0
D(αa1 +α2)
.
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6. Value of Information
In this section, we evaluate the equilibrium strategies presented in the previous section. First, we compute
the equilibrium costs for each population in Section 6.1. Next, we analyze the individual value of informa-
tion in Section 6.2. Finally, we examine the social value of information in Section 6.3.
For simplicity and ease of presentation, we restrict our attention to information environments where ηH =
1 and ηL = 0.5, i.e. population H players receive the exact state of nature, while population L players only
know common knowledge. However, our analysis below easily generalizes to cases where ηL = 0.5< ηH <
1. Recall that when ηH = 1 and the fraction of players belonging to population H equals unity (λH = 1),
we recover the classical complete and perfect information game. Similarly, when the fraction of players
belonging to population H equals zero (λH = 0) we recover the classical imperfect information game. For
notational ease, we denote the regime boundaries given in (37), Λ j(ηH = 1, p), as Λ j(p), for j ∈ {1,2,3}.
For ηH = 1, the marginal type distributions (27) simplify to Pr(Ha) = p and Pr(Hn) = 1− p. The beliefs
µ¯ from (29) and (30) simplify to:
µ¯L(θ = a, tH = Ha|tL = L) = p2,
µ¯L(θ = a, tH = Hn|tL = L) = p(1− p),
µ¯L(θ = n, tH = Ha|tL = L) = p(1− p),
µ¯L(θ = n, tH = Hn|tL = L) = (1− p)2,
(44)
for population L, and
µ¯H(θ = a, tL = L|tH = Ha) = 1,
µ¯H(θ = n, tL = L|tH = Ha) = 0,
µ¯H(θ = a, tL = L|tH = Hn) = 0,
µ¯H(θ = n, tL = L|tH = Hn) = 1,
(45)
for population H. Additionally, the quantities defined in (37) can be particularized as follows:
α˜1 = (1− p)αn1
α̂1 = pα
a
1
K1 =
K0
α¯1+α2
K2 =
K0
αa1 +α2
K3 =
K0
αn1 +α2
.
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6.1. Equilibrium costs
Utilizing the equilibrium strategy distributions from Propositions 1–4, we obtain the following expressions
for the equilibrium cost, Ci∗θ , for a player of population i in each state, as given by (12):
CL∗n =

(
K1
(1−λH)D −
(1− p)λH
1−λH
)
(αn1 (K1+ pλHD)+β1)
+
(
1−
(
K1
(1−λH)D −
(1− p)λH
1−λH
))
(α2 (D− (KIL+ pλHD))+β2) , in φ1(
K4
(1−λH)D −
λH
1−λH
)
(αn1 (K4)+β1)
+
(
1−
(
K4
(1−λH)D −
λH
1−λH
))
(α2 (D−K4)+β2) , in φ2
α2(1−λH)D+β2, in φ3
α2 (D−K3)+β2, in φ4
CL∗a =

(
K1
(1−λH)D −
(1− p)λH
1−λH
)
(αa1 (K1− (1− p)λHD)+β1)
+
(
1−
(
K1
(1−λH)D −
(1− p)λH
1−λH
))
(α2 (D− (K1− (1− p)λHD))+β2) , in φ1
αa1 (K2)+β1, in φ2,φ3,φ4
CH∗n =

αn1 (K1+ pλHD)+β1, in φ1
αn1 (K4)+β1, in φ2
αn1 (λHD)+β1, in φ3
αn1 (K3)+β1, in φ4
CH∗a =
{
α2 (D− (K1− (1− p)λHD))+β2, in φ1
αa1 (K2)+β1, in φ2,φ3,φ4
(46)
(47)
(48)
(49)
where K4 := K2
(
1+
αa1 −αn1
α¯1+α2
)
.
The expressions for the expected population-dependent cost (Ci∗), the state-dependent social cost (C∗θ ),
and the expected social cost (C¯∗) can be computed by plugging the expressions (46)–(49) into (13), (14),
and (15), respectively.
6.2. Individual value of information
We now analyze the relative individual value of the information environment (p,λH,ηH = 1,ηL = 0.5) and
its relationship with λH.
First, we present two useful lemmas. The first lemma provides that if the players in population H exclu-
sively choose one route in a given state, then the realized cost for a population H player in that state is less
than that of a population L player:
LEMMA 1. Consider the information environment (p,λH,ηH = 1,ηL = 0.5). In a given state θ ∈ {a,n},
if xtH∗1 = 0 or 1, then C
L∗
θ >C
H∗
θ , and the relative individual value of information in that state, Vθ , is positive.
Proof of lemma 1. In order for routing all demand through one route (xtH∗1 = 0 or 1) to be an equilibrium
action for population H, the expected cost of the route chosen must be less than the other route. Since
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ηH = 1, the signal that population H players receive will always be the true state of nature, i.e. they will
always receive signal n (resp. a) when the true state is n, (resp. a). Therefore, the expected cost calculated
by population H players coincides with the realized cost. Thus, in a given state, the realized cost of routing
all of population H’s demand through the chosen route is less than the realized cost of taking the other route.
Since we assume that the demand is sufficiently high (see (31)), there is no equilibrium where all players
take the same route. Thus, there must be some players of population L on the route not chosen by population
H; these population L players necessarily receive a higher cost in equilibrium. Therefore, CL∗θ > C
H∗
θ , and
by (20), we obtain that the relative individual value of information in that state is positive. 
From the second lemma, we obtain that that if the population H players split their demand along both
routes in a given state, then the realized cost for a population H player is equal to that of a population L
player.
LEMMA 2. Consider the information environment (p,λH,ηH = 1,ηL = 0.5). In a given state θ ∈ {a,n},
if xtH∗1 ∈ (0,1), then the realized equilibrium cost in that state for a population L player is equal to that of a
population H player, i.e. CL∗θ =C
H∗
θ . Therefore, the relative individual value of information in that state, Vθ ,
is zero.
Proof of Lemma 2. In order for xtH∗1 ∈ (0,1) to be an equilibrium action for population H, the expected
cost on both routes must be equal. Recall that since ηH = 1, the signal that population H players receive will
always coincide with the true state of nature, and thus the expected cost will be equal to the realized cost
on both routes. Therefore, in that state, the realized equilibrium costs on both routes are equal, and players
of either population receive the same cost, i.e. CL∗θ = C
H∗
θ . Following (22), the relative individual value of
information for that state is zero. 
We present in Theorem 1 our results on the relative expected individual value of information for the
information environment (p,λH,ηH = 1,ηL = 0.5). We find that the relative expected value, V , is positive
when λH < Λ3(ηH, p), and zero otherwise. In other words, in parameter regimes φ1–φ3, a population H
player will always have a lower expected equilibrium cost than a population L player, and in regime φ4, all
players will have the same expected equilibrium costs. Formally:
THEOREM 1. For a given p and ηH = 1, if λH < Λ3(p), then the relative expected individual value of
information, V > 0. If λH ≥ Λ3(p), then V = 0.
Proof of Theorem 1 To show that the relative expected value of information is positive in φ1 – φ3, we
must show that the relative value of information is positive in one state and zero in the other, or positive in
both states. By Lemma 1 it suffices to show that population H players play xtH∗1 ∈ {0,1} in one state, and
xtH∗1 ∈ (0,1) in the other, or xtH∗1 ∈ {0,1} in both states.
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To show that the relative expected value of information is zero in φ4, we must show that the the relative
value of information is zero in both states. By Lemma 2 it suffices to show that players in population H play
xtH∗1 ∈ (0,1) for both states.
In regime φ1: the equilibrium split fractions for population H players are xHn∗1 = 1 and xHa∗1 = 0 (Proposi-
tion 1). By Lemma 1, in this regime the relative individual value of information is positive in both states. It
follows that the relative expected individual value of information is also positive.
In regimes φ2,φ3: Propositions 2 and 3 state that xHn∗1 = 1, and xHa∗1 ∈ (0,1). Therefore, the relative indi-
vidual value is positive in state n (Vn > 0), and zero in state a (Va = 0). It follows that the relative expected
value of information is positive in these regimes.
In regime φ4: the equilibrium play of type H for both states is to split, i.e. xHn∗1 ,xHa∗1 ∈ (0,1), see Propo-
sition 4. Therefore, by Lemma 2, the realized equilibrium costs must be equal for all players in both states,
thus the relative expected individual value of information is zero in this regime. 
We illustrate the results of this theorem in Figures 8 and 9 with numerical results generated using the
parameters in Table 2. The costs were normalized by the social optimum cost for ease of comparison. In
Figure 9, we see that the relative expected individual value of information (the difference between the solid
red line and dashed blue line) is positive when λH < Λ3(p), and zero when λH > Λ3(p).
It is interesting to note that the expected cost for population H is non-decreasing in λH. That is, the
more of the population that has access to the network state information, the higher the expected costs for
type H (Figure 9). Additionally, players that don’t receive information still enjoy a reduction in expected
equilibrium cost when others are receiving information. These effects were also noted by Mahmassani and
Jayakrishnan (1991) in their simulations. This poses a potential conundrum for TIS providers: providers
may want to increase market share to maximize revenue, but in doing so, they may limit or even nullify
the usefulness of their service to their subscribers. Indeed, in regime φ4, players with access to information
experience no additional benefit compared to those without.
We note that the relative expected individual value of information is greatest when λH is close to zero
(Figure 9). This is intuitive, since information provides the most value when the fewest number of players
can take advantage of it. One may also expect that the relative expected individual value of information
would decrease as λH increases, since more players are utilizing the information. Indeed, this is the case in
φ1 and φ3 it does decrease. However, in φ2, the relative expected individual value of information increases
with λH. While the expected cost for population H players does not change in φ2, the expected cost for
population L players increases as λH increases.
6.3. Social value of information
Recall from (25) that the expected social value of information, W , represents the reduction in the expected
equilibrium cost that an average player enjoys under the given information environment, (p,λH,ηH =
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Figure 8 Population- and state-specific costs vs. the fraction of informed users; normalized by soc. opt. cost.
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Figure 9 Expected cost in equilibrium for players in each population; normalized by soc. opt. cost.
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1,ηL = 0.5), compared to the baseline situation where nobody has any access to information (i.e. λH = 0).
Theorem 2 concretizes the relationship between the expected social value of information and the fraction of
population H players.
THEOREM 2. For the information environment (p,λH,ηH = 1,ηL = 0.5), as the fraction of population
H players increases:
i.) in φ1, W increases in λH,
ii.) in φ2, W is constant in λH,
iii.) in φ3,

W decreases in λH, if Λ2(p)≥ 2α2D+β2−β12D(αn1 +α2)
W increases then decreases in λH, if Λ2(p)<
2α2D+β2−β1
2D(αn1 +α2)
< Λ3(p)
W increases in λH, if Λ3(p)≤ 2α2D+β2−β12D(αn1 +α2)
,
iv.) in φ4, W is constant in λH
Proof of Theorem 2 Recall from (25) that the expected social value of information is the difference
between the baseline expected cost, C0∗, and the expected equilibrium cost C¯∗. Since C0∗ is a constant, in
order to show that the expected social value of information increases in λH in regime φ1, is constant in
regime φ2, etc., it suffices to show that the expected social cost C¯∗ decreases in λH in regime φ1, etc. From
Propositions 1–4, we can calculate the expected social cost C¯∗ for each regime (15):
C¯∗ =

(λH)2 (Dp(1− p)(αa1 +αn1 +α2− α¯1))+λHK1 ((1− p)αn1 +(2p−1)α¯1− pαa1 )
+
K21
D α¯1+α2
(
D−2K1+ K
2
1
D +
K1
D β1+
(
1− K1D
))
, in φ1
p
(
α2
(
D− K0αa1+α2
)
+β2
)
+(1− p)(K4D (αn1 K4+β1)+ (1− K4D )(α2(D−K4)+β2)) , in φ2
p(αn1 K2+β1)+(1− p)((λH)2αn1 D+λHβ1+(1−λH)2α2D+(1−λH)β2), in φ3
p
(
α2
(
D− K0αa1+α2
)
+β2
)
+(1− p)
(
α2
(
D− K0αn1 +α2
)
+β2
)
, in φ4
(50)
First, we would like to show that in regime φ1, C¯∗ decreases in λH. We note that in regime φ1, C¯∗ is
quadratic in λH and is minimized at λ̂H =
K1 (pαa1 − (1− p)αn1 − (2p−1)α¯1)
2(Dp(1− p)(αa1 +αn1 +α2− α¯1)
. For λH below this threshold,
the derivative of the quadratic is negative. Therefore, if the right boundary of regime φ1 is at or below this
threshold, i.e. Λ1(p) ≤ λ̂H, then C¯∗ is decreasing in λH in this regime. Solving the inequality Λ1(p) ≤ λ̂H
yields the condition αn1 ≤ αa1 , which is satisfied by assumption (A1)b. Hence, we obtain that the expected
social cost, C¯∗, is decreasing in λH in φ1.
It is trivial to observe in (50) that in φ2 and φ4 the expected social cost C¯∗ is constant in λH.
Lastly, we argue that in φ3, C¯∗ has different behavior depending on the parameter values. We note from
(50) that in regime φ3, C¯∗ is quadratic in λH and is minimized at λ˜H =
2α2D+β2−β1
2D(αn1 +α2)
. Below this threshold,
the derivative of the quadratic is negative, and above this threshold, it is positive. Hence, if this threshold
is at or below the left boundary of regime φ3, i.e. λ˜H ≤ Λ2(p), then the derivative is positive throughout φ3
and the expected social cost increases in λH. If this threshold falls between the boundaries of regime φ3, i.e.
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Λ2(p) < λ˜H < Λ3(p), then the derivative is negative on the interval [Λ2(p), λ˜H), zero at λ˜H, and positive on
the interval (λ˜H,Λ3(p)]. Therefore, in regime φ3, the expected equilibrium cost, C¯∗, decreases then increases
in λH. Finally, if the threshold occurs at or above the right boundary of φ3, i.e. λ˜H≥Λ3(p), then the derivative
is negative throughout regime φ3, and C¯∗ is decreasing in λH. 
Corollary 1 below provides the expressions for the λH where the expected social cost is minimized (and
consequently, the expected social value of information is maximized). We denote this fraction as λHmin. Above
this fraction of highly-informed players, there is no additional reduction of expected social cost in increas-
ing the fraction of population H players. One can view this fraction as the “optimal” level of information
distribution for reduction in social cost. A similar result was observed in simulations by Mahmassani and
Jayakrishnan (1991). Notably, this fraction is less than or equal to the threshold where the relative individual
value of information goes to zero (see Thm. 1). If λHmin < Λ3(p), then there exists a range of λH where it
is personally advantageous for population L players to become population H players, but it is harmful to
society for them to do so.
COROLLARY 1. Global minimum of expected social cost in equilibrium.
For the information environment (p,λH,ηH = 1,ηL = 0.5), the smallest λH where the minimum expected
social cost is achieved is given below:
λHmin :=

Λ1(p), if Λ2(p)≥ 2α2D+β2−β12D(αn1 +α2)
2α2D+β2−β1
2D(αn1 +α2)
if Λ2(p)<
2α2D+β2−β1
2D(αn1 +α2)
< Λ3(p)
Λ3(p) if Λ3(p)≤ 2α2D+β2−β12D(αn1 +α2)
.
(51)
The social costs for each state are illustrated in Figure 10 for p= 0.2 and 0.6, and the expected social costs
are illustrated in Figure 11. When few players have access to incident information in regime φ1, providing
information to players significantly reduces the expected social cost. However, in φ2, there is no change in
social cost from providing information to more players. In regime φ3, under certain conditions, there can
be a modest reduction of expected social cost (Fig. 11b). Under other conditions, however, increasing λH
increases the expected social cost (Fig. 11a). In φ4, there is no change in expected cost as λH increases.
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Figure 10 Social costs vs. fraction of informed users λH; normalized by soc. opt. cost.
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Figure 11 Expected social cost vs. fraction of informed users λH; normalized by soc. opt. cost.
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7. Concluding Remarks
As TIS become more ubiquitous, it becomes even more important to study the effects of information. This
paper introduces a Bayesian congestion game model that allows for the study of the effects of heterogeneous
information about traffic incidents on route choices. Our model provides a unifying analytical framework
which considers incident probability, information distribution, and information accuracy. We are able to
capture many of the effects of information observed by Mahmassani and Jayakrishnan (1991), namely: (i)
there exists an optimal fraction (less than 1) of commuters with information that achieves the maximum
reduction in social cost; (ii) the cost for commuters with information increases as the fraction of informed
commuters increases; and (iii) even commuters without information receive a reduction in cost when others
have access to information.
In our analysis of the value of information, we only focused on the case where population H players
receive perfectly accurate information about the incident state. However, real TIS may be noisy and inac-
curate, and additional research is needed to fully characterize the effects of the distribution of imperfect
information. While our equilibrium results hold for general ηH (see figure Figure 12 for the equilibrium
regimes and split fractions for ηH = 0.75), further work is necessary to fully characterize and understand
the effects of noisy information on equilibrium route choices and costs.
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Figure 12 Equilibrium regimes and split fractions for ηH = 0.75.
The results of this paper raise some practical considerations. TIS providers must take into account that
the value of information to informed commuters decreases as the fraction of highly-informed commuters
increase. This is especially pertinent for services like Waze, which use crowdsourced data. As more people
use such services, the quality of information may improve due to having more users reporting information,
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but the relative benefit of having access to information may decrease as more commuters take advantage of
it. TIS providers must balance these effects in order to provide a useful service.
We also identify that there are conditions where it would be advantageous for an individual to switch
from being a less-informed to a highly-informed commuter (i.e. relative value of information is positive),
but it would be detrimental for society if they did so. Our model can help social planners by identifying
conditions where this may occur.
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